The line between competitive intelligence, or CI, and illegal corporate espionage is not always clear. This is especially true as technology increases the ability to gather and distribute information. There are also differences between domestic and international espionage laws. Whenever a company engages in an uncertain area of CI processing, it opens itself up to possible legal risk.
Intelligence Vs. Espionage
Corporate espionage, sometimes referred to as industrial espionage, is different than spying for political or national security reasons. The purpose of corporate espionage is to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of a specific business or industry. These are the same goals pursued by competitive intelligence strategies. The difference between CI and corporate espionage normally comes down to the means of acquiring information.
For example, it is legal to ask a competitive firm’s customers what they like or do not like about the competitor’s products. No illicit activity occurs to receive the information. On the other hand, blackmailing a competitor’s employee to garner information is illegal; blackmail is an illicit activity in the United States. The differentiation between licit and illicit is generally cited as the difference between espionage and intelligence gathering.
Risks of Corporate Espionage
Corporate espionage is relatively limited. Most forms of information gathering are legal, even if some are widely considered unethical. There are two broad means of committing corporate espionage: violating contracts or breaking other laws in the course of collecting information.
Nondisclosure agreements and gag orders are commonplace in corporate circles. Companies spend a considerable amount of time trying to protect trade secrets or other competitive advantages. Those with access to sensitive information can be required to sign away their right to reveal anything material.
Other acts normally considered illegal, such as fraud or bribery for example, can turn standard CI into espionage. Penalties for breaking these laws depend on their respective jurisdictional statutes. This is different than breaking a contract, where punishment might be detailed in the original agreement.
The Israeli military says it has indicted a soldier on charges of sharing secret information that made its way into Syrian hands.
Thursday’s statement says the soldier relayed “classified information capable of harming state security” about the military’s activity along the frontier between Israel and Syria.
The soldier served in the armored corps and gave material to a “foreign agent” who then passed it on to Syrian officials.
Such cases are rare, and the military would not elaborate. Local media say the soldier is a member of Israel’s Druse minority.
Many Druse Arabs serve in Israel’s military. Members of the close-knit society have relatives on both sides of the Golan Heights.
Israel captured the strategic plateau overlooking northern Israel from Syria in the 1967 Mideast war.
âThe restaurant did not report this to us,â Lt. Philip Harrington said on Tuesday. âAs a result they could face ramifications down the road. I donât know.â
Sores-Fernandes is a 38-year-old Allston resident. Police say he worked at Zaftigs at the time the camera was placed in the handicap bathroom.
New Zealandâs relationships with its Pacific neighbours have been damaged by the latest revelations that the GCSB has been spying on Cabinet Ministers and top level Government officials in the Solomon Islands, the Green Party said today.
“Our relationships with Pacific countries are hugely important and the Government now needs to fix the damage itâs done by spying,” said Green Party security and intelligence spokesperson Kennedy Graham.
“When it first became known that the GCSB was spying on the Pacific, our Government said that it wouldnât damage our relationships with our neighbours. Thatâs now clearly untrue, with a former chief of staff to the Solomon Islands Prime Minister saying he is âshockedâ.
“This clearly has nothing to do with terrorism, because the spying targets were mostly senior officials within the Solomon Islands government, including the Prime Ministerâs chief of staff.
“Serious questions need to be answered around why the GCSB took such an interest in the Solomon Islands. Is it because of the PACER Plus trade deal being negotiated?
“We need to be sure that the New Zealand Government didnât use spying to gain an unfair advantage in trade negotiations, in a similar way to how it has played hardball when negotiating trade deals with other Pacific nations such as Tonga and Samoa.
“It is also disturbing that the GCSB spied on anti-corruption campaigners in the Solomon Islands, who rely on confidential sources to do their important work.
“Pacific countries are our friends and neighbours. Spying on friends is not the Kiwi way,” Dr Graham said.
NSW Police Deputy Commissioner Nick Kaldas was heavily targeted in the bugging operation. Photo: Peter Rae
Deputy NSW police commissioner Nick Kaldas deserves an apology for being targeted with dozens of listening device warrants more than a decade ago, an upper house inquiry is expected to recommend.
The report of the parliamentary inquiry into a long-running bugging scandal that has rocked the upper echelons of the NSW police force will also find that a new inquiry should be held into how listening device warrants are obtained.
It will also be critical of successive police commissioners, including the current Commissioner Andrew Scipione, for the lack of action to resolve complaints over the decade-old scandal.
NSW Police Commissioner Andrew Scipione (centre), flanked by NSW Premier Mike Baird and Prime Minister Tony Abbott, has been criticised for failing to resolve the scandal. Photo: James Alcock
The inquiry examined the conduct and progress of Operation Prospect, an Ombudsman’s investigation into a police bugging operation, code-named Mascot, which ran between 1999 and 2001 and targeted allegedly corrupt police.
The scandal has rocked the top of the police force as another Deputy Commissioner, Catherine Burn, was team leader of Mascot – the operation targeting Mr Kaldas. Mr Scipione oversaw the operation for a time.
Mascot used a corrupt former policeman, code named M5, to target allegedly corrupt police with a listening device. But it emerged there was insufficient or no evidence of wrongdoing by many of the more than 100 police and civilians whose names appeared on warrants issued by the Supreme Court.
It emerged during the inquiry that Mr Kaldas was named in 80 warrants for listening devices issued to Mascot.
It is understood the inquiry’s report, due to be tabled in the NSW Parliament on Wednesday morning, will recommend that the state government issue a formal apology to Mr Kaldas over being targeted by the operation.
It will also recommend an apology be given to Channel Seven journalist Steve Barrett, who was named on 52 warrants.
The long-running tensions between Mr Kaldas and Ms Burn boiled over on the final day of the inquiry’s hearings, when Mr Kaldas accused Ms Burn of raising his name with an informant later used to bug him more than a decade ago.
Ms Burn had earlier detailed serious corruption allegations against Mr Kaldas that had led him to be targeted by a bugging operation of which she was a member, codenamed Mascot, during 1999-2001.
NSW Premier Mike Baird has indicated his preference is to wait for the outcome of a parallel inquiry by NSW Ombudsman Bruce Barbour into the bugging scandal, which is not due to report until June, before taking any action.
