June 30, 2011: During the last three years, China has opened eight National Intelligence Colleges in major universities. In effect, each of these is an “Espionage Department” at these universities, where, each year, about 300 carefully selected applicants are accepted, to be trained as spies and intelligence operatives. China has found that espionage is an enormously profitable way to steal military and commercial secrets. While Chinese Cyber War operations in this area get a lot of publicity, the more conventional spying brings in a lot of stuff that is not reachable on the Internet.
One indicator of this effort is the fact that American counter-intelligence efforts are snagging more Chinese spies. But this is largely due to increased spying effort by China, rather than more success by the FBI and CIA. This use of industrial espionage has played a large part in turning China into the mightiest industrial and military power on the planet.
For over two decades, China has been attempting to do what the Soviet Union never accomplished; steal Western technology, then use it to move ahead of the West. The Soviets lacked the many essential supporting industries found in the West (most founded and run by entrepreneurs), and was never able to get all the many pieces needed to match Western technical accomplishments. Soviet copies of American computers, for example, were crude, less reliable and less powerful. Same with their jet fighters, tanks and warships.
China gets around this by making it profitable for Western firms to set up factories in China, where Chinese managers and workers can be taught how to make things right. At the same time. China allows thousands of their best students to go to the United States to study. While most of these students will stay in America, where there are better jobs and more opportunities, some will come back to China, and bring American business and technical skills with them. Finally, China energetically uses the “thousand grains of sand” approach to espionage. This involves China trying to get all Chinese going overseas, and those of Chinese ancestry living outside the motherland, to spy for China, if only a tiny bit.
This approach to espionage is nothing new. Other nations have used similar systems for centuries. What is unusual is the scale of the Chinese effort. Backing it all up is a Chinese intelligence bureaucracy back home that is huge, with nearly 100,000 people working just to keep track of the many Chinese overseas, and what they could, or should, be to trying to grab for the motherland. This is where many of the graduates of the National Intelligence College program will work.
It begins when Chinese intelligence officials examine who is going overseas, and for what purpose. Chinese citizens cannot leave the country, legally, without the state security organizations being notified. The intel people are not being asked to give permission. They are being alerted in case they want to have a talk with students, tourists or business people before they leave the country. Interviews are often held when these people come back as well.
Those who might be coming in contact with useful information are asked to remember what they saw, or bring back souvenirs. Over 100,000 Chinese students go off to foreign universities each year. Even more go abroad as tourists or on business. Most of these people were not asked to actually act as spies, but simply to share, with Chinese government officials (who are not always identified as intelligence personnel) whatever information obtained. The more ambitious of these people are getting caught and prosecuted. But the majority, who are quite casual, and, individually, bring back relatively little, are almost impossible to catch.
Like the Russians, the Chinese are also employing the traditional methods, using people with diplomatic immunity to recruit spies, and offering cash, or whatever, to get people to sell them information. This is still effective, and when combined with the “thousand grains of sand” methods, brings in lots of secrets. The final ingredient is a shadowy venture capital operation, sometimes called Project 863, that offers money for Chinese entrepreneurs who will turn the stolen technology into something real. No questions asked. If you can get back to China with the secrets, you are home free and potentially very rich.
But there are some legal problems. When the Chinese steal some technology, and produce something that the Western victims can prove was stolen (via patents and prior use of the technology), legal action can make it impossible, or very difficult, to sell anything using the stolen tech, outside of China. For that reason, the Chinese like to steal military technology. This kind of stuff rarely leaves China. And in some cases, like manufacturing technology, there’s an advantage to not selling it outside of China. Because China is still a communist dictatorship, the courts do as they are told, and they are rarely told to honor foreign patent claims.
An Australian citizen has faced an Israeli court charged with spying for Hamas, the Islamist group which rules the Gaza Strip.
Eyad Abuarga was arrested along with his wife when he arrived at Tel Aviv airport in March, and has been in custody ever since.
Israeli intelligence officials allege the electronics engineer was recruited by Hamas while living in Saudi Arabia, and received weapons training in Syria before making a trip to Israel.
They accuse him of trying to enter Israel on his Australian passport in order to conduct spy operations.
Hamas is banned in Israel.
In court, the 46-year-old said he was an innocent Australian tourist and denied ever having trained in Syria.
A detailed indictment alleges he had links to the Palestinian struggle since the 1980s, but that from around 2007, he began attending a number of secretive meetings with Hamas members.
The indictment also claims he was asked to help with encoding, that he supplied photographic equipment which could find and guide missiles, and that he trained with Hamas in Syria.
“The accused was taken to a room with prayer rugs where he met four others,” the indictment says.
“After a while they went out and began to train, shooting a pistol and a rifle at different targets. After they finished he was driven back to Damascus. He was blindfolded some of the way.”
The indictment is so detailed as to describe the colours of the car he travelled in and blindfold he was given.
His lawyer, Leah Tzemel, told AM all the evidence comes from interviews with her client which has not been corroborated with outside sources.
Abuarga is a Palestinian refugee who grew up on the Arabian Gulf but later moved to Australia and became an Australian citizen.
As he waited for the hearing to begin, Abuarga told the media at the court near Tel Aviv he had never trained in Syria.
“I’d like to say loud and clear that I’m not a member of Hamas, never was and never will, or any other group,” he said.
Abuarga had been living in Saudi Arabia, until he was arrested on arrival at Ben Gurion Airport earlier this year.
He says he was visiting Israel for a holiday.
“I am an Australian tourist, who came to this country with my wife to celebrate our 25th anniversary of our marriage, and ended up in jail,” he said.
Abuarga’s wife and children have now returned to Australia.
He told the media he had been treated well while in jail.
But his lawyer says if an acceptable plea bargain is not reached, she will release more information about the facts of his interrogation.
The matter has been adjourned for a fortnight.
Meanwhile, the Federal Government says consular officials have been providing extensive help to Abuarga.
A spokeswoman for the Department of Foreign Affairs says officials have visited the man in prison seven times and have also provided extensive help to his family.
Cairo, Egypt (CNN) — An Egyptian court on Thursday sentenced three men — an Egyptian and two Israeli nationals — to 25 years in prison for spying for Israel.
Tarek Abdel-Razek Hussain Hassan, 37, the Egyptian owner of an import-export firm, was arrested in August. The Supreme State Security Court’s criminal department tried the two Israelis in absentia.
Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Levanon said he had no comment on the case.
Officials charged the three with spying for Israel and harming Egypt’s national interests after Hassan tried to recruit Egyptians working in the telecommunications industry to spy for Israel.
Hassan received $37,000 to recruit Egyptians who could spy in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon for the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.
According to the charges, the spy ring began in May 2008, when Hassan met abroad with the two Israelis.
Hassan is the first person convicted of spying for Israel since Egypt’s January 25 revolution, which resulted in the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak.
“This case sends two messages, one to Egyptians and another to Israel,” said Abdel Aleem Mohamed, senior researcher of Israel Studies at the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. “To Egyptians, the way they deal with Israel will be different and that national security issues will be dealt with severely. To Israel, they are sending a message that the system has changed from the days of Mubarak.”
The case closes as another begins. Ilan Grapel, a 27-year-old dual U.S.-Israeli citizen was arrested June 12 on suspicion of spying. Israel denies he is a spy.
Mohamed predicted none of the cases would dramatically affect relations between the countries.
“This situation won’t affect Egypt-Israel ties because Egypt is free to punish whoever compromises the country’s security,” Mohamed said. “Israel would do the same to an Egyptian spy. Spying is what countries do.”
A Garden City businessman and former vice president of the USD 457 Board of Education has been accused of placing and using a concealed camcorder to eavesdrop in the women’s bathroom at his business.
John Scheopner, 56, was arrested at 8:30 a.m. Wednesday in Finney County on allegations he used a concealed camcorder to eavesdrop on a 53-year-old Garden City woman, a 28-year-old Lakin woman and a 32-year-old Garden City woman in the women’s bathroom at Scheopner’s Water Conditioning, 2203 East Fulton Plaza, according to Garden City Police Sgt. Michael Reagle. Scheopner allegedly eavesdropped on the 32-year-old woman twice, Reagle said. The incidents allegedly occurred on April 30.
Scheopner, whose resignation from the school board was accepted on May 23 after 14 years on the board, also is accused of two counts of intimidation of a witness or victim for allegedly attempting to deter the 53-year-old woman and 28-year-old woman from testifying, Reagle said.
Scheopner could not be reached for comment.
Scheopner made his first court appearance Wednesday and was released on his own recognizance, according to the Finney County Jail log. He has been charged with four counts of use of a concealed camcorder to eavesdrop and two counts of intimidation of a witness or victim, according to the Finney County Attorney’s Office. All are misdemeanors.
Scheopner is scheduled for a case management hearing at 1:15 p.m. July 28.
Reagle said that while the incident occurred April 30, the investigation continued after that. An arrest affidavit was filed requesting Scheopner be charged. The arrest warrant was issued, and he was arrested when he made his first appearance, Reagle said.
Lawyer Lara Bors was appointed Monday to Scheopner’s seat on the board in a unanimous vote by the board.
The term to which Bors was named expires on June 30, 2013.
There rarely is a dull moment in Indian politics. The latest is the hasty attempt to hush up the bugging of the finance ministry offices. Pranab Mukherjee, the finance minister himself has dismissed the episode as “bogus”. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) says no such bugging took place. And Home minister P. Chidambaran, to whom the IB reports, says he didn’t know about the bugging till he saw it in the newspapers last week. But the controversy refuses to die down.
According to The Indian Express which broke the story, on September 4, 2010, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), an agency that reports to the Finance Ministry, brought in a team of private sleuths to conduct a security sweep of the offices to check for eavesdropping devices. They found “plantable adhesive substances” in 16 locations in the office of the Finance Minister, the offices of his long-time aide Omita Paul, and personal secretary Manoj Pant as well as two conference rooms. Groove marks were found on the “adhesive substances”, suggesting that bugging devices were planted and removed later to wipe out surveillance trail.
Three days later, Mukherjee wrote to the Prime Minister asking him to launch a “secret probe” into the “serious breach of security”. He said no “live microphone” or recording devices were found but it could have “wider ramifications”. The Prime Minister then directly tasked the then IB chief, Rajiv Mathur, to probe Mukherjee’s complaint rather than passing it on to Chidambaram. The IB conducted its investigations and reported that there was no breach of security. A Home Ministry official told The Economic Times, “The IB probe concluded that the adhesive may just be chewing gum left behind by careless visitors or maintenance staff. The matter was subsequently treated as closed around six months back.” But why would any visitor or cleaning staff discard chewing gum or adhesives in a minister’s high-security office?
The corridors of power are rife with conspiracy theories. Leading the suspect list is Mukherjee’s political opponents.
Observers point to the simmering mistrust within the higher echelons of government. Given that Mukherjee wields a great degree of influence within the UPA, and is a strong contender for prime ministership after Manmohan Singh, perhaps someone within the Congress party wanted to keep a tab on him or pull him down a notch or two. It’s not the first time that such cloak and dagger activities have come to light. In May 2010, Outlook magazine reported how senior leaders like Sharad Pawar and Digvijay Singh had been illegally tapped. Sources told the Outlook that during the July 2008 no-confidence motion on the Indo-US nuclear deal, bugging devices were used extensively to listen in on the conversations of opposition leaders. Years ago, Zail Singh, former president of India felt that the Rashtrapati Bhawan was tapped. He told Vir Sanghvi, well known columnist and former editor, Hindustan Times, that he made it a point to discuss sensitive matters in the garden. Key officials and journalists are on the government’s watch list and their cell phones are allegedly tapped regularly.
Another theory doing the rounds is that a business house had engineered the bugging. Sources told The Times of India, “There are many private sector players who could be interested. If they were aware of a particular meeting on a subject crucial to their bottom line, then a corporate could take such a risk,” he said. So if a corporate house was to “buy off a lower level staff”, these transmitters could be smuggled in. “And the easiest way to plant them is using adhesives,” he adds. But why would businessmen adopt such risky options when they can easily find out what they want through their informants in the ministry or political cronies?
Yet another theory is the involvement of the foreign hand. Agencies seeking policy-related information critical for their governments to gain advantage from Indian deals or projects could have planted the bugs. For instance, there have been periodic reports of attempts from China to access classified information. Last year, Chinese hackers tried taking over websites and email accounts of government officials. Sounds a bit farfetched though!
But there’s not enough evidence to conclusively prove any of the conspiracy theories.
Asked if Mukherjee’s office bugged, B. Raman, a former senior RAW official, told the Outlook magazine, “Circumstantially yes if one takes into account the important position occupied by him in the Cabinet, his important role involving sensitive discussions in his office on many sensitive issues of a political nature and the suspicion that there are question marks over his head in the Congress leadership. Technically, it would depend on where the adhesive material was found. If it was found at places easily visible to the naked eye, then the allegations may not be correct. If the adhesive was found at places not easily visible to the naked eye, the allegation will acquire some credibility.”
Had the bugging device been found, there would have been valid ground for the charges. With just “adhesives” stuck in 16 locations, there’s no way the bugging can be proved or traced. A retired senior official known for his expertise in technical intelligence told The Times of India that as a snooping operation, it was poorly done. “There are far more sophisticated ways of monitoring,” he said. For instance, the telephone could have been converted into a transmitter, using laser beams. Solar-charged transmitters could have been planted in photo-frames etc. “Adhesives are used to stick transmitters that secretly record voice in a premise. It is then transmitted to a recorder kept at a distance. If this was the case in Mukherjee’s office, he may have been either a victim of a one-off snooping for a few hours, or sustained snooping over a long period of time,” the official added.
The speculation will continue. And we’ll likely never know the truth.
