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Global articles on espionage, spying, bugs, and other interesting topics.

Keep abreast of the espionage threats facing your organisation.

Is Wikileaks Killing Espionage?

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Wikileaks may be to espionage as the internet is to newspapers.

Why should governments pay good money and risk agentsā€™ lives when they can get dirt on their enemies with the click of a finger?

Think about it: Russia allegedly paid thousands of dollars (and a fair amount of risk to its international reputation) in order to train one blonde honey trap (Zatuliveter) to spend years infiltrating Westminsterā€¦just so that she could find out a few of the places where the Brits keep their nukes.

But just the other day, Wikileaks posted a comprehensive list of all the global list of infrastructure sites which the US considers critical for its national security interest – ABSOLUTELY FREE!

If there is one thing wikileaks is actually guilty of is threatening all those intelligence jobs the world over – which is a pretty mean thing to do in a recession.

Yet that is a small price to pay for its potential to finally bury the cold war.

A spectre is haunting Europeā€” the spectre of Wikileaks. All the powers of the old world have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope Obama and Tsar Putin, China and South Korea, liberals and police-spies.

Wikileaks has indeed become the new Communism – the first truly international phenomenon since Marx and Engels that has been able to successfully unite the world; not East vs West, North vs South, Left vs Right – but States vs People. In doing so, it has starkly revealed the previous divisions to be mere red herrings, not worth wasting oneā€™s time with. All states, Wikileaks reveals, are as bad as each other, and all are more interested in preserving the status quo than serving their people (indeed, are willing to sacrifice their own people to preserve the status quo). Assange can make us all into anarchists.

And just as during the first Red Scare, oneā€™s support of wikileaks has become a litmus test of responsible debate, separating the respectable liberals (the former ā€˜anti-communist leftā€™) from the ā€˜lunatic fringeā€™.

In the old days of Blunt and Burgess, well-placed people who had serious qualms against their countries, societies or ā€˜the systemā€™ at large had only one sure-fire recourse: provide their secrets to the ā€˜other sideā€™ – the USSR.

Sure, some people who did this were committed Communists who supported the Soviet Union, but in general it was a very diverse bunch: persecuted gays, stifled bureaucrats, people with petty office grievances, people who were blackmailed and most importantly, people who through their positions had found out so much about the crimes and abuses committed by their government in their name, and usually with some degree of personal involvement (through their work in intelligence or defence) that their conscience compelled them to speak out, and often the only voice that was listening were the Russians.

The downside to this was that when they were unmasked, the dirty secrets these people had revealed about their own governments were overshadowed and invalidated by the fact that they had been ā€˜enemy spiesā€™, even though few of them particularly cared for Russia, and were just driven into Soviet arms by their anger, powerlessness and sometimes, a misguided sense of civic duty.

Enter wikileaks. Now, those same people – the misfits, the disappointed zealots, the bitter and the dissidents – no longer have to compromise themselves through being used in theĀ  interests of a foreign country. They can upload the dirt onto a value -neutral platform. Those who yesterday would have been driven to espionage have instead become whistleblowers. And whistleblowers are always good guys. Why? Because no matter what their intentions or motivations, itā€™s what they blow the whistle on that counts.

Thatā€™s why most governments are now so busy trying to tarnish the messengers – to distract attention from the message itself – spelled out in black and white on screens worldwide.


WikiLeaks and espionage — Israeli style

The U.S. is under attack by an enemy within. Skilled at game
theory warfare, this foe targets the most sensitive realm of U.S. national
security: its relations with other nations.

The online publication of a quarter-million documents
chronicling diplomatic exchanges is notable both for whats omitted and whats
included. To determine whether this latest release was a form of espionage,
analysts need only examine how this treasure trove of trivia was peppered with
documents certain to damage U.S. relations.

To identify its origins, analysts must answer a key
question: Cui Bono? To whose benefit?

One clue: the release of degrading and insulting language
about Turkish leaders soon after they insisted in late October that the U.S. no
longer share Turkish intelligence with Tel Aviv.

That request from a valued ally marks a critical step in
isolating Israel by requiring that the U.S. shut down Israeli operations inside
its 16 intelligence agencies, the White House and the Intelligence Committees
in both the House and Senate. Tel Aviv was not pleased.

Turks remain outraged at the lack of accountability for the
execution-style killing by Israel Defense Forces of nine Turkish citizens
aboard a humanitarian ship that was boarded in international waters while
sailing to Gaza with provisions to relieve an Israeli siege.

Was this release a tit-for-tat, Tel Aviv style? Is WikiLeaks
the visible face of an Israeli disinformation campaign? Whose interests were
served by disrupting U.S.-Turkish relations?

Intent is determinative

A leak on this scale is only a leak if it is a random data
dump. If items were purposely included or excluded based on their intended
effect, its an intelligence operation. Former National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski points out how this release is seeded with information
that is surprisingly pointed.

Take for example the cables indicating that Chinese leaders
are inclined to cooperate with the U.S. in reunifying North and South Korea
under the leadership of the south. That information was guaranteed to embarrass
Chinas leaders, damage U.S. relations with Beijing and make reunification more
difficult.

From a game theory perspective, that damaging result was
fully foreseeable. With the U.S. economy teetering on a meltdown, the creation
of a rift with Americas largest trading partner was also an assault on the
economic strength required for the U.S. to sustain a viable defense.

Similarly, the pointed references to Arab leaders were
destined to weaken their political credibility at home while complicating
relations abroad. By exposing Arab displeasure with Iran, this operation also
sharpened the divide between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, a source of ongoing
tensions and a key barrier to forming a viable government in Iraq.

The effect was certain to complicate U.S. disengagement and
raise Americas costs in both blood and treasure.

The cables involving Saudi leaders were released soon after
Washington agreed to allow Riyadh to purchase $60 billion in U.S. aircraft and
armaments over a multi-year period. Tel Aviv was not pleased.

By targeting the credibility of both Saudi Arabia and the
U.S., this operation targeted the two nations pressing hardest for an end to
Israels occupation of Palestine.

Transparency is the biggest
threat

Has Tel Aviv panicked? After more than six decades of
nonstop provocations while routinely portraying itself as the perennial victim,
has Israels storyline lost traction?

Zionism faces an existential threat though not from Iran or
those Tel Aviv portrays as Islamofascists. The threat lurks in the
fast-emerging transparency that confirms pro-Israelis as the source of the
intelligence that took the U.S. to war on false premises.

A critical mass of disinformation persuaded the U.S. to wage
war in pursuit of an agenda long sought by Zionist extremists.

Steve Rosen, a former employee of the Israel lobby, has
promised to testify on the lobbys routine receipt of classified U.S.
intelligence. Is this massive release of classified materials meant to make the
lobbys intelligence-gathering operation appear routine?

Whats included in the WikiLeaks release is pointed. Whats
excluded is even more so: the lack of facts chronicling the role that Israel
has long played in undermining U.S. interests.

Israel has escaped accountability for more than six decades.
Was the WikiLeaks release seeded to discredit the U.S. at this time-critical
juncture? The evidence suggests that what we see is not a data dump but a
disinformation operation.

Last week, Israeli resistance to a peace plan was front-page
news. This week the news is all about war with Iran. The Jerusalem Post immediately crowed that WikiLeaks vindicated
Israel by citing Arab leaders concerns about Iran.

These latest releases even enabled Tel Aviv to suggest that
if U.S. intelligence was flawed on a nuclear-armed North Korea, how can anyone
trust America to contain a nuclear Iran?

To whom should this release be attributed? Who benefitted?

Jeff Gates is author of Guilt By Association —
How Deception and Self-Deceit Took America to War. See
www.criminalstate.com.


Espionage charges for UK worker

A Russian woman working in the British parliament is to be deported after security services arrested her on suspicion of espionage, The Sunday Times reported.

Britain’s domestic intelligence service MI5 decided that Katia Zatuliveter, 25, who works for Mike Hancock, a Liberal Democrat member of the House of Commons defence select committee, was secretly working for the Russian intelligence service as a ‘sleeper’, the paper reported.

The arrest is believed to be the first time since the end of the Cold War that someone working in parliament has been accused of spying for Russia.

The newspaper said MI5 believes the attractive Zatuliveter was deliberately targeting Hancock, 64, who has a strong interest in Russia.

Hancock dismissed allegations that his assistant was a spy.

‘She is not a Russian spy. I know nothing about espionage, but she has been subjected to a deportation order. She is appealing it, because she feels, quite rightly, that she has done nothing wrong,’ he told the Press Association.

A spokesman for the Home Office, or interior ministry, said: ‘We do not routinely comment on individual cases.’

Zatuliveter, who underwent security vetting before taking up her job, was arrested by police and immigration officials last week and is being held at a secure facility awaiting deportation to Russia.

The move to deport her comes after she was stopped while re-entering Britain at London’s Gatwick airport in August. Before releasing her, security officials questioned her in depth about her work for Hancock, the report said.

A source told The Sunday Times: ‘Her presence here is not considered to be conducive to national security. There was unhappiness about what she could have access to. The intention is to show her the door.’

The report said the British MP employed Zatuliveter after meeting her in Strasbourg, where he often travels on business as a member of the parliamentary forum of the Council of Europe.

The deportation could place further strain on Britain’s diplomatic relations with Russia, which are only just emerging from an icy period after the murder by poisoning of the dissident Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006.


Espionage investigation centers on Fort Bragg

Martin, who enlisted in 2006, also told the agent that he was seeking “long-term financial reimbursement,” and that he could be very valuable over a 15- or 20-year career, the warrant says.

Martin offered to bring the agents two documents at their next meeting and accepted $500 in cash from the agent, according to the warrant.

At a meeting the next day at the same hotel, Martin produced two documents – one labeled “secret” and the other “top secret” and accepted $1,500 in cash, the warrant alleges. He agreed to meet the agent again on Nov. 19, when he produced 51 pages of secret and top secret documents, according to the warrant.

The warrant does not address how Martin came under suspicion or how he came into contact with the undercover FBI agent.


Espionage charges for UK parli worker

A Russian woman working in the British parliament is to be deported after security services arrested her on suspicion of espionage, The Sunday Times reported.

Britain’s domestic intelligence service MI5 decided that Katia Zatuliveter, 25, who works for Mike Hancock, a Liberal Democrat member of the House of Commons defence select committee, was secretly working for the Russian intelligence service as a ‘sleeper’, the paper reported.

The arrest is believed to be the first time since the end of the Cold War that someone working in parliament has been accused of spying for Russia.

The newspaper said MI5 believes the attractive Zatuliveter was deliberately targeting Hancock, 64, who has a strong interest in Russia.

Hancock dismissed allegations that his assistant was a spy.

‘She is not a Russian spy. I know nothing about espionage, but she has been subjected to a deportation order. She is appealing it, because she feels, quite rightly, that she has done nothing wrong,’ he told the Press Association.

A spokesman for the Home Office, or interior ministry, said: ‘We do not routinely comment on individual cases.’

Zatuliveter, who underwent security vetting before taking up her job, was arrested by police and immigration officials last week and is being held at a secure facility awaiting deportation to Russia.

The move to deport her comes after she was stopped while re-entering Britain at London’s Gatwick airport in August. Before releasing her, security officials questioned her in depth about her work for Hancock, the report said.

A source told The Sunday Times: ‘Her presence here is not considered to be conducive to national security. There was unhappiness about what she could have access to. The intention is to show her the door.’

The report said the British MP employed Zatuliveter after meeting her in Strasbourg, where he often travels on business as a member of the parliamentary forum of the Council of Europe.

The deportation could place further strain on Britain’s diplomatic relations with Russia, which are only just emerging from an icy period after the murder by poisoning of the dissident Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006.